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The Impact of Optimal
Tariffs and Taxes on
Agglomeration
ABSTRACT
This paper extends an economic geography model by tariffs to analyze their impact on
welfare and sustainability of agglomerations. Policies with and without cooperation are
compared, with the goal of maximizing aggregated welfare in the former and regional
welfare in the latter case. The main result is that under cooperation poorer regions are
worse off in two respects. In the short-run they loose even more welfare and in the
long-run sustainable agglomerations in richer regions get more likely. Thus, although
cooperation could generate aggregated welfare gains the potential losers face even in the
short-run no incentive to remove tariffs unless they are compensated appropriately, for
instance by transfers. In this sense transfers from the rich to the poor are not only a
policy to reach the goal of equity but also a necessary precondition to reach aggregated
efficiency.
JEL-Classification: F13, H21, F42, R12, F15








The Uruguay Round has reduces tariﬀs reasonably, although protection still
remains on a substantial level. Exceptions are mainly the large customs
unions like EU and NAFTA within tariﬀs have been eliminated while outer
tariﬀs tariﬀs are still reasonably. Though the EU, for instance, is char-
acterized by an average tariﬀ level of only 3.3% a few industries like tex-
tiles, clothing, leather goods and automotive industries are protected much
stronger. Furthermore, corresponding import tariﬀs of the EU trade part-
ners are, on average, 5 to 6 times of the EU-level (Francois, Glismann and
Spinanger, 2000).
Justifying tariﬀs theoretically can be done either by the classical large
country assumptions or by rent shifting arguments of the ’new trade the-
ory’ (e.g. Flam and Helpman (1987), Gros (1987) or Brander (1995) for an
overview). Since the new economic geography (NEG) relies on very simi-
lar assumptions than new trade theory, namely monopolistic industries, the
question arises whether also in these kind of models an incentive for tariﬀs
exists and, in particular, how tariﬀs may aﬀect the development of regional
inequalities. Answering this question within a theoretical NEG-model is the
main goal of the paper.
The development of the NEG has been initiated mainly Krugman (1991)
with the goal of explaining sustainable income diﬀerences between regions
or countries (e.g. surveys of Puga and Ottaviano (1998), Ottaviano (1999),
Masahisa and Thisse (1996) and Fujita, Krugman and J.Venables (1999)).
Although a broad variety of contributions have been derived so far the forces
of driving agglomerations are almost identical: Positive externalities are
emerging if industries and ﬁrms cluster together and the relative impor-
tance of externalities matters the more, the less important trade barriers
are, such that falling trade costs, for instance by integration, make a sustain-
able core-periphery equilibrium more likely. Mainly for technical reasons,
trade costs are usually considered to be of the iceberg-type according to
Samuelson (1954), meaning that trade causes expenses without creating in-
1come of corresponding market participants.1 Under this assumption in the
short-run trade cost reductions always raise welfare in all regions as other-
wise lost resources are saved. But, if trade costs are, at least partly, of a
tariﬀ type, this short-run result may not be valid anymore, since importing
regions may loose additionally tariﬀ- revenues. Especially for less developed
regions who depend much on monopolistic imports this revenue loss could
be strong enough to reduce regional welfare.
Tariﬀs aﬀect also the long-run equilibrium by means of stabilizing the
symmetric and equal distribution of economic activity. On the one hand
tariﬀs increase trade costs and generate the well known eﬀect of from the
NEG that trade barriers protect domestic industries and a sustainable core-
periphery equilibrium gets less likely. On the other hand tariﬀs generate
revenues which are the higher the more the region or country relies on im-
ports of monopolistically commodities. But, relying relatively more on im-
ports implies also that the region is relatively less developed such that tariﬀs
generate an implicit transfer from the rich to the poor. Therefore, as long
as the symmetric distribution of economic activity is distorted, this implicit
transfers by tariﬀs force the economy back to the symmetric equilibrium.
Nevertheless it must be emphasized that tariﬀs reduce aggregated welfare
since resources are prevented to move to the more eﬃcient region. From the
view of a central planer, therefore, a removal of all kinds of trade barriers
would increase aggregated eﬃciency. Unfortunately, this best solution con-
cerning eﬃciency cannot be reached automatically, since potential losers face
no incentive for common tariﬀ reductions, in the short-run as well as in the
long-run. One solution to this trade oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency could
be an appropriate compensation of the losing region by the winning region,
for instance by transfers. In this sense, transfers can be seen rather as a
necessary policy to reach eﬃciency if initially unequal regions join a customs
union than as a policy with the goal of equity.
The remainder of the paper derives theoretically the above presented
1An exception is Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2003), who assume that trade costs
absorb ressources.
2results step by step. Section 2 presents the basic NEG-model with tariﬀs
on the two considered industries, a competitive sector and a monopolistic
sector. Section 3 analyzes brieﬂy, as a reference case, the standard outcome
if policy is inactive. Section 4 starts the policy analysis by the assumption
that regions do not cooperate and follow the goal of maximizing only their
own welfare. Contrastly, section 5 analyzes the optimal policy in case of
cooperation. But, compared with the no-cooperation case the aggregated
welfare gain can be distributed unevenly across both regions. In order to
avoid these regional welfare losses section 6 derives the necessary transfers to
sustain at least the welfare level of the no-cooperation case for each region.
Finally, section 7 analyzes the consequences of the derived policies for the
long-run income convergence and how the sustainability of core-periphery
equilibria is aﬀected. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
The model of this section bases on a general 2-region-agglomeration model
of Forslid (1999) which is an analytically solvable version of the original
core-periphery model of Krugman (1991). The innovation of the model is
the additional consideration of tariﬀs and taxes by which governments may
achieve the goals of welfare optimizing and income convergence. The main
distinction between tariﬀs and other trade costs is that tariﬀs generate gov-
ernment revenues while other trade costs, modeled as iceberg type, imply
only costs with no corresponding income.
There are two symmetric regions called home and abroad. Symmetry
of both regions guarantees that, with the notational exception of an aster-
isk, most equations describing foreign behavior are similar to corresponding
domestic equations. Therefore, the model is presented mainly from the do-
mestic perspective and corresponding foreign equations are illustrated only
if necessary.
The economy in both regions consists of two sectors, a competitive sector,
3named agriculture, producing a homogeneous good A under constant returns
of scale (CRS) and a monopolistic sector, named industry, producing diﬀer-
entiated varieties, xi, under increasing returns to scale (IRS). All available
varieties from both regions are combined to a composite good X which is

















where n and n∗ denote the number of domestic and foreign ﬁrms and σ the
constant elasticity of substitution between varieties. All ﬁrms within each
region face identical demand and supply conditions such that optimal in-
and output decisions will be identical within each region. Therefore, and for
simplicity the subscript i is neglected in the following.
There are two input factors of production, unskilled and skilled labor.
Unskilled labor is immobile between both regions and to guarantee symmetry
the unskilled labor supply of each region is normalized to one. Aggregated
skilled labor supply is normalized to one, too, but, in contrast to unskilled
labor, mobile between both regions following real wage diﬀerences. Therefore,
in case of full employment L skilled are employed in the domestic region and
L∗=1-L skilled are employed in the foreign region.
The homogenous agricultural good A is produced with the only input
unskilled labor and marginal cost of unity. Since competition guarantees
zero proﬁts and agricultural goods are traded for free producer prices of
unity hold in both regions. Consumer prices, in contrast, may diﬀer between
both regions according to corresponding taxes and tariﬀs. For simplicity only
regional taxes tA and t∗
A on agricultural consumption are considered. But,
since the agricultural good is homogeneous, the impact of a tax is very similar
to the impact of a tariﬀ. Both instruments raise consumer prices by the same
size and the only diﬀerence is that rents created by a tariﬀ are separated in
producer rents and government revenues while taxes create only government
revenues. The value of all rents is equal for both instruments such that
regional welfare is unaﬀected by the choice of the instrument. Therefore
and since the objective of this paper is rather an analysis of regional welfare
4than intraregional income distribution, concerning the agricultural sector in
the following only taxes will be considered. If tA denotes the net tax rate
agricultural consumer prices are given by 1+tA and government receives the
share TA ≡ tA/(1+tA) of agricultural consumption expenditure as revenues.
For the only reason of notational simplicity in the following the gross tax TA
will be preferred.
The industrial sector consists of n domestic and n∗ foreign ﬁrms producing
each a diﬀerentiated variety x under increasing returns to scale. Trade of
varieties requires usual ”iceberg” trade costs τ≥1 according to Samuelson
(1954) implying that the export of the amount x∗ requires the shipment of the
amount τx∗. Additionally, the importing domestic region may charge a gross
tariﬀ on industrial imports TI such that consumer prices in the importing
region are τ(1 − TI)−1 times the producer price p∗ of the exporting foreign
region.
On the costs side production of variety x requires ﬁxed and variable costs.
Fixed costs stem from the ﬁxed input of one skilled worker per ﬁrm each earn-
ing the wage w. This implies that the regional number of ﬁrms corresponds
to the regional skilled-labor supply given by L and (1−L) in the foreign
region, respectively. Variable costs are given by the unskilled wage level of
unity and assuming the unit input of unskilled labor to be (σ − 1)/σ ﬁrms
costs are given by
C(x) = w + (σ − 1)/σx. (2)
Individual ﬁrms are assumed to be too small to inﬂuence the aggregate price
level. Then, proﬁt maximizing with respect to (1) and (2) yields a producer
price of p = 1 which is equal for all ﬁrms in the domestic region. Since
consumer prices diﬀer by corresponding tariﬀs and other trade costs, prices


























5The zero-proﬁt condition implies that in equilibrium revenues equal costs.
This condition ﬁxes each ﬁrms output to x = σw, while each ﬁrm employs
(σ − 1)w unskilled employees and one skilled employee.
Nominal regional income Y consists of three components, wage income of
the unskilled and skilled workers as well as government income G:
Y = 1 + Lw + G. (4)
Government income can be separated further in tariﬀ revenues GI from im-
ported varieties and tax revenues GA from agricultural consumption. Tariﬀ
revenues can be derived by determining the import demand from the utility
(1), using the producer price of p = 1 as well as trade costs τ. Since govern-







with Θ deﬁned in (3). Agricultural tax revenues are easier to determine
since government receives the share TA of regional expenditure for agricul-
tural goods, namely GA = TA(1 − γ)Y . Combining tax and tariﬀ revenues







σ−1γ + TA(1 − γ)

Y (6)
Since government income G depends on nominal income Y and vice versa













σ−1γ − TA(1 − γ).
(7)
The parameter (1/T) denotes the factor by which nominal income is increased
by tariﬀs and taxes.
63 Equilibrium
Two kinds of equilibrium are determined by the model, a short-run equilib-
rium and a long-run equilibrium. The short-run equilibrium is characterized
by a given distribution of skilled workers, L and 1−L, on the domestic and
foreign region. Then, the model above determines prices and wages clearing
product and labor market. If these short-run prices and wages imply an in-
terregional real wage diﬀerence skilled workers face an incentive to migrate
to the region with higher earnings. Therefore, the long-run equilibrium is
reached if no incentive for migration exists anymore. This can be the case
either if real wages are equalized or if all skilled locate already in one region
(L=0 or 1 − L=0) such that any further migration is impossible.
Calculating the real wage diﬀerence, which is the crucial determinant
of migration, requires ﬁrst the derivation of nominal wages. They can be
determined from the product market equilibrium by equalizing supply and
demand. Each ﬁrm produces an equilibrium amount of σw and faces foreign
and domestic demand for its variety which can be derived from the utility
function (1). Equalizing supply and demand yields that product market
equilibrium is guaranteed if:










with Y and Y ∗ deﬁned by (7) and Θ deﬁned by (3). Both equations depend




P 1−σTΘ∗ + P ∗1−σT ∗
i
+ γ2(1−L)[ΘΘ∗ − 1]




ΘP ∗1−σT ∗ + P 1−σT
i
+ γ2L[ΘΘ∗ − 1]
(σP ∗1−σT ∗ − γ(1−L))(σP 1−σT − γL) − γ2ΘΘ∗(1−L)L
(9)
with P,T,Θ and the corresponding foreign variables deﬁned in (3) and (7).


















ΘP ∗1−σT ∗ + P 1−σT
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P γ(1 − TA)1−γ (10)
where the last term denotes the relative regional price level.
As a reference case, ﬁgure 1 presents the real wage relation of (10) if pol-
icy is inactive (TI=T ∗
I =TI=T ∗
I =0). In all cases the real wage relation gets
unity at L = 0.5 indicating that the symmetric equilibrium is also a long-
run equilibrium. But, the stability of this long-run equilibrium depends on
the real wage relation in case of small disturbances. Consider for instance
a labor share slightly above 0.5 in one region as in the case of τ = 1.02.
Since this deviation of the symmetric equilibrium implies a short-run wage
relation above unity even more ﬁrms and skilled migrates to this region. Ag-
glomeration occurs and the symmetric equilibrium is unstable. Technically,
the symmetric equilibrium is unstable if the slope of the corresponding real
wage curve is positive. The critical trade cost level, below which instability















Parameters: γ = 0.5,σ = 4
Figure 1: Domestic real wage relation and skilled labor share
If the symmetric equilibrium is unstable other stable long-run equilibria
must exist with agglomeration in one of the two regions. If, like in the
8case of τ = 1.02, an initial distortion of the symmetric equilibrium leads to
migration, this process continues until all skilled labor and all ﬁrms locate in
the foreign region. This so called core-periphery equilibrium is stable as long
as no real wage incentive exists to migrate back. Analogous to the breakpoint
the critical trade cost level, below which the core- periphery equilibrium is
stable is called ’sustainpoint’.
There are two agglomeration forces within this model at work, a forward
and a backward linkage. The forward linkage stems from the fact that the
more ﬁrms locate in one region the more varieties are available, which reduces
the price level and increases real wages. The backward linkage describes the
additional regional demand ﬁrms are creating since now, because of trade
costs, more expensive imports can be substituted by domestically produced
varieties. Simultaneously also dispersion forces in terms of product and la-
bor market competition exist. The relative importance of agglomeration and
dispersion forces depends on the parameters of the model. Usually parame-
ters are chosen such that prohibitive trade barriers (autarky) correspond to a
dominance of dispersion forces. This assumption rules out the possibility of a
collapse of the general equilibrium where, independent of the trade cost level,
all economic activity is always concentrated in one region (cf. the no-black-
hole condition of Fujita et al. (1999)). Therefore, under normal conditions, a
reduction of trade costs (integration) reverses the relative weight of agglom-
eration and dispersion forces such that core-periphery equilibria are stable
at least for a range of trade costs.
4 Maximizing welfare without cooperation
The general equilibrium model derived above considers two policy instru-
ments by which each regional government may aﬀect welfare and the real
wage relation determining the long-run development of the corresponding
region. Since there are two regions with two governments it can be dis-
tinguished between non-cooperative and cooperative policies. In the non-
cooperative case each region maximizes its welfare depending on the policy
9choice of the other region. Analyzing this non-cooperative policy is the sub-
ject of this section. The cooperative case and ist consequences will be treated
in the subsequent sections.
In the non-cooperative case, maximizing welfare is synonymical to maxi-








where nominal income Y is divided by the regional price level. For any given
foreign tariﬀ T ∗
I and tax rate T ∗
A optimal policy can be now derived by setting
the partial derivatives of the real income with respect to TI and TA equal to
zero (cf. appendix). Then, domestic optimal tax and tariﬀ rates are given
by:
TI,Opt =
σP ∗1−σT ∗ − γ(1−L) − γLΘ∗






As long as the standard assumptions about the parameters of the previ-
ous section are fulﬁlled γ < 1 < σ both optimal rates are always positive,
independent of the policy choice of the other region (cf. appendix). Re-
garding the optimal tariﬀ, TI,Opt, this result here for a model of economic
geography conﬁrms the well known home market eﬀect of the new trade the-
ory (e.g. Brander (1995)). By a tariﬀ, demand is shifted from foreign to
domestic varieties such that the domestic backward linkage is strengthened.
The additional demand generates additional proﬁts of the monopolistic ﬁrms
resulting in higher wages and, therefore, in higher income. But, although
this nominal wage eﬀect is always positive, the welfare gain is restricted by
the simultaneously increasing price level.
Regarding the optimal tax rate, TA,Opt, the result corresponds to the so-
cial optimum analysis of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) in their original paper on
monopolistic competition. Taxes on agricultural consumption shift demand
towards industrial varieties. By this way the monopolistic market distortion
of supplying too expensive and too less varieties can be at least partly cor-
rected. Partly, because the resources for subsidizing the industrial sector are
10received by taxing the agricultural sector, which itself creates a distortion.
However, the positive sign of the optimal rates of (12) indicates an overall
regional welfare gain of taxing agricultural consumption.
Optimal tax and tariﬀ of (12) depend on the chosen policy of the foreign
region, which itself depend on the decision of the domestic region. Policy
Nash-equilibrium is achieved, if (12) is fulﬁlled for both regions. Unfortu-
nately, this equations system is non-linear, such that only numerical solu-
tions can be derived. Figure 2 illustrates the percental welfare gain of such
regional policies compared with the case of zero taxes and tariﬀs for certain





























Parameters: γ = 0.5,σ = 4
Figure 2: Domestic optimal tariﬀs and real income gain at Nash-equilibrium
Quite surprising, if governments follow the optimal policy rule of (12)
there is no automatic gain for both regions. Denoting the lower critical level
of development by LCL and the upper critical level by LCU the domestic
region gains only if the relative number of industries is below LCL or above
LCU. Furthermore, falling transport costs imply a decrease of LCL and LCU.
Integration in the sense of falling trade costs (except tariﬀs) reduces the
opportunity for less developed regions and improves the opportunity of high
developed regions to achieve regional welfare gains by corresponding optimal
11taxes and tariﬀs. The reason for this outcome is mainly the terms of trade
eﬀect. Since less developed regions rely relatively more on industrial imports
also the impact of industrial tariﬀs is relatively stronger. And by playing the
Nash-game the stronger player maintains its advantage also in equilibrium.
5 Maximizing welfare under cooperation
Looking to reality falling transport as a result of technological progress are
accompanied by falling trade barriers almost all over the world. In the ma-
jority of cases these falling trade barriers are a result of negotiations between
participating countries. The fact that negotiations are necessary indicates
that welfare gains are not the automatic consequence of unilateral trade cost
reductions. In this sense, the aim of this section is an analysis of the welfare
consequences if both regions cooperate to maximize aggregated welfare.
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with Y deﬁned in (7). Again, partial derivatives have to be set to zero (cf.








For the optimal tariﬀs an analytical expression cannot be derived. Instead,
































Figure 3 shows the numerical solution to this system where the left graph dis-
plays optimal domestic tariﬀs and the right graph the percental real income



































Parameters: γ = 0.5,σ = 4
Figure 3: Domestic optimal tariﬀs and real income gain under cooperation
At the symmetric equilibrium (L=0.5) all optimal tariﬀs are zero while to
the right and to the left optimal tariﬀs are becoming positive and negative,
respectively. This result is mainly a consequence of the trade costs and the
corresponding diﬀerent price levels in both regions. The more developed a
region is, the lower the price level and from this perspective rent creating
tariﬀs improve welfare by more in the developed region than they reduce
income in the poorer region. From the perspective of the less developed
region argumentation is exactly opposite. Although import subsidies reduce
domestic welfare, foreign welfare compensates this loss by additional earnings
of the exporting ﬁrms. Furthermore, the lower the trade costs the smaller
are the corresponding tariﬀs. In case of full integration with zero trade costs
optimal tariﬀs are even zero and the corresponding curve in ﬁgure (3) overlaps
the x-axis. Thus, only if trade costs diﬀer from zero the home market eﬀect
can be existent and optimal tariﬀs of (15) maximize aggregated welfare.
Concerning the welfare gain (right graph) the interesting results arrives
that a region my gain by cooperation only if its level of development is
high enough, more precise if L > LC. Because of symmetry both regions
gain only if LC < L < 1−LC. As in the non-cooperation case LC shifts
leftwards as integration proceeds such that corresponding losses of the less
developed region melt away. Thus, welfare gains in both regions as a result of
cooperation are the more likely, the less unequal regions are and the further
13integration has proceeded.
6 Transfers
The last section has demonstrated that maximizing aggregated welfare may
go ahead with losses of the less developed region. Therefore the question
arises why regions who loose by cooperation may agree in common tariﬀ
reductions. One possible answer can be that the loosing regions are some-
how compensated for the expected welfare loss, for instance by correspond-
ing monetary transfers. Introducing transfers in the model requires some
changes of the basic assumptions. To hold these changes as simple as pos-
sible transfers R are assumed to be paid from the foreign to the domestic
region. Then, a positive sign of R indicates transfers to and a negative sign
indicates transfers from the domestic region. Furthermore, these transfers
are ﬁnanced by government revenues such that government spending is given
by G = GI + GA + R in the domestic region and by G∗ = G∗
I + G∗
A − R in
the foreign region. Under these assumptions the wage rates from (9) change
to:
w = γ




(σP ∗1−σT ∗ − γ(1−L))(σP 1−σT − γL) − γ2ΘΘ∗(1−L)L
w∗ = γ
σ(1−R)ΘP ∗1−σT ∗ + (1+R)[σP 1−σT + γL(ΘΘ∗ − 1)]
(σP ∗1−σT ∗ − γ(1−L))(σP 1−σT − γL) − γ2ΘΘ∗(1−L)L
(16)








[1 + (1 − L)w
∗ − R], (17)
depending now on the level of transfers. Optimal tariﬀs and taxes with and
without cooperation, (12, 14, 15) stay valid and do not have to be modiﬁed
as can be prooved easily.
The interesting question is now whether optimal policy under cooperation
generates enough additional wealth to ﬁnance transfers compensating the
14respective loosing region. Denoting by Y N
R and Y N
R
∗ the real income at
the Nash-equilibrium without cooperation and by Y C
R (R) and Y C
R
∗(R) the
real income under cooperation for given transfers, the necessary amount of
transfers can be derived as follows:
Y C












∗(0) > Y N
R
∗,
R = 0 , otherwise.
(18)
Figure 4 display the necessary transfers according to (18) guaranteeing
each region to reach at minimum the welfare level of the no-cooperation case.
Two important results can be derived from this ﬁgure. First, if regions are
not too dissimilar, both gain from cooperation and compensating transfers
are unnecessary. Furthermore, this range widens if trade costs decrease and
integration proceeds. Second, even at full integration with zero trade costs




















Parameters: γ = 0.5,σ = 4
Figure 4: Necessary transfers under cooperation avoiding welfare losses
Altogether, transfers are an appropriate policy to reach the goal of max-
imizing aggregated welfare while simultaneously the welfare loosing regions
are compensated for their loss. Concerning less developed regions this result
implies that joining a customs union may be useful from a welfare point of
view only if appropriate transfers are granted by the richer regions.
157 Stability and agglomeration
While the last section has analyzed the welfare eﬀects of taxes and tariﬀs
the aim of this section is an analysis of the consequences of these policies for
the stability of core-periphery equilibria. Since the real wage relation had
been determined to be the crucial variable characterizing stability of any
equilibrium, the remainder of this section will concentrate on the eﬀects of
the derived optimal policies on this variable.
If policy is inactive, as demonstrated in section 3, the model generates
an intermediate range of transport costs, for which core-periphery equilibria
become stable. This result has been explained by the relative large weight of
corresponding forward and backward linkages outweighing dispersion forces.
Now, optimal policies concerning tariﬀs and taxes, aﬀect the forward linkage
by their impact on prices and the backward linkage by reallocating demand.
The interplay of these eﬀects determine in which direction policies shifts the
real wage relation
Consider ﬁrst the non-cooperation case where both regions goal is the
maximization of regional welfare by choosing policies according to (12). In
general, as mentioned above, the corresponding tax-tariﬀ equilibrium can be
determined only numerically, but for the extreme core-periphery distribution
of L = 0 or L = 1 also analytical results can be derived. Fortunately, the core-
periphery distribution is also of special interest since the question whether
agglomeration is sustainable can be answered by analyzing the sustainpoint.
Concentrating on the arbitrary case of L = 0, where all industry is con-
centrated in the foreign region, welfare optimizing policies can be derived
from (12) and are given by:
















τ2−2σ(σ + γ)(σ − 1)
σ+γ (σ2 − γ)
−σ + (σ − 1)
γ−σ+1
τ1+γ−σ (2σ − 1 + γ)σγ−σ , (20)
16which has to be set equal to one to calculate the sustain point. Again, because
of non-linearities in τ only numerical solutions can be derived. Figure 5
presents these sustainpoints for diﬀerent parameters σ and γ. For comparison
also the sustainpoints of the of the case without any government intervention
and the case of non-cooperation are presented.




















Parameters: —: γ = 0.5, ··· : γ = 0.6
Figure 5: Sustain points for diﬀerent parameters
In all cases τsus increases with γ and decreases with σ. A larger share of
industrial varieties within the consumption bundle strengthens the agglom-
eration (backward) linkage while a lower σ increases industry proﬁts by a
larger mark-up. Mostly striking is the fact that sustain points of the non-
cooperation cases are strictly below the reference cases of zero policies and
even more below the sustain points in case of cooperation. This is mainly a
result of the (positive) optimal tariﬀs that protect the domestic market and
enables ﬁrms to pay higher wages. In case of cooperation optimal tariﬀs of
the less developed region (at L=0) are even negative and strengthen the real
wage advantage of the already developed region. Furthermore, also transfers
which compensate for the welfare loss cannot improve real wage disadvantage
of the less developed region suﬃciently.
However, so far the result has been derived that cooperation damages the
real wage relation and the long-run prospect of convergence of less developed
regions. Since this result maintains even if tranfers compensate for the welfare
17loss the ﬁnal question arises which level of transfer may guarantee a real wage
relation of unity. At the sustain point the necessary level of transfers,RSUS,
can be calulated by setting (20) to one and solving for RSUS to get:
RSUS = 1 −
2(1 − TI)(1 − ΘP γ)
1 − ΘΘ∗ + TI [ΘΘ∗γ − 1 + ΘP γ(1 − γ)]
(21)
Substituting now the optimal tariﬀs of (15) yields the necessary amount
of transfers to guarantee a long-run income convergence at L=0. Figure 6
presents this result with the simple outcome that transfers must increase
continuously as integration proceeds and trade costs decrease. Furthermore,
the volume of transfers is considerable higher than the level which has to be
paid to compensate only the welfare loss.













Parameters: γ = 0.5,σ = 4
Figure 6: Necessary transfers (in % of Y ) to guarantee convergence for L=0
8 Conclusion
This paper has shown that within an agglomeration model countries or re-
gions face an incentive for taxing the competitive sector and protecting do-
mestic monopolistic industries by corresponding tariﬀs. Two cases have been
compared, policies with and without cooperation, while the goal is maximiz-
ing aggregated welfare in the former case and regional welfare in the latter
case. The main result is that under cooperation especially less developed
18regions are worse oﬀ in two respects. They loose welfare even in the short-
run and worsen their comparative advantage such that sustainable income
diﬀerences in the long-run get more likely.
Monetary transfers may solve this trade oﬀ between equity and eﬃciency
by redistributing wealth from the richer to the poorer regions. If only the
welfare loss should be compensated relatively low transfers in terms of 1-2%
of regional income are suﬃcient. But, if transfers should guarantee also con-
vergence in the long-run, substantially higher transfers up to 30% of regional
income are necessary.
Combining these results transfers are not only an instrument of ’social
policy’ to reach the political goal of equity, but necessary during an integra-
tion process to make less developed regions removing their tariﬀs such that
an aggregated eﬃcient distribution of economic activity is reached.
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20Appendix
Optimal taxes and tariﬀs without coop., eq.(12):
To derive the optimal tax and tariﬀ rates the corresponding partial deriva-



























(1 − γ)Y γ

γ(1−L)(1 − ΘΘ∗) − σP ∗1−σT ∗


(σP ∗1−σT ∗ − γ(1−L))(σP 1−σT − γL) − γ2ΘΘ∗(1−L)L
.
(12.3)
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If both, tax rate and tariﬀ, are chosen to optimize welfare (12.4) and (12.9)
must be solved simultaneously for TI and TA:
TI,Opt =
σP ∗1−σT ∗ − γ(1−L) − γLΘ∗


























which is positive as long as γ < 1 < σ.
Optimal taxes and tariﬀs under coop., eqs. (14,15):
The partial derivatives of the the overall welfare (13) with respect to domestic





































22Substituting the partial derivatives yields:




+σγγP 1−σΘ∗(1 − TI)L
+(σ−1+γ)
h








(1 − TI)(σP 1−σT − γL + γσΘ(1−L))











P ∗1−σγσ (1 − T ∗
A)
1−γ (1 − TA)
γ (1−L)Θ.
(14.4)







while resubstituting (14) in (14.4) or (14.3) yields for TI,Opt and T ∗
I,Opt the
following non-linear equation system:
γΘ∗L
σ − 1
+P
γP
∗1−σ−γ −
1−σTI
1 − TI

(1−γ)P
∗1−σ+ γ(1−L)+
γσLΘ∗
σ − 1

=0,
γΘ(1−L)
σ − 1
+P
∗γP
1−σ−γ−
1−σT ∗
I
1−T ∗
I
"
(1−γ)P
1−σ+γL+
γσ(1−L)Θ
σ − 1
#
=0.
(15)
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